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Abstract
Shimony’s method of analysis does not distinguish adequately be-
tween a legitimate assumption of no faster-than-light action in one
direction and the to-be-proved assertion of faster-than-light tranfer of
information in the opposite direction. The virtue is noted of replacing
the logical framework based counterfactual concepts by one based the
concept of fixed past and open future.
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Professor Shimonys article[1] is an extremely helpful contribution to the
subject. It summarizes in a lucid way the large areas of agreement between
us, and provides a back-to-basics proof of the two propositions that are the
main technical results of my paper[2]. Shimonys long and detailed derivation
of those two basic propositions should lay completely to rest all but one of
the objections that were raised against my more compact 1997 proof[3]. I
shall examine presently that remaining objection, but first will emphasize
some key points of agreement mentioned by Shimony.
Shimony identifies the motivation of my work, namely the fact that the
theorems of J.S. Bell[4] and his followers[5] rest explicitly or implicitly on the
local-hidden-variable assumption that the values of the pertinent observables
exist whether they are measured or not. That assumption conflicts with or-
thodox quantum philosophy, and that fact undermines the idea that some
sort of faster-than-light transfer of information is implied by the conjunction
of Bells theorem and the assumed validity of the predictions of quantum the-
ory. The more likely conclusion, from the orthodox perspective, is a failure
of the hidden-variable assumption. The orthodox interpretation of Bells the-
orem is not that faster-than-light transfer of information exists. It is rather
that the hidden-variable assumption is false. Shimony notes that a proof
not requiring a hidden-variable assumption of the need in quantum theory
for faster-than-light information transfer “would be a profound scientific and
philosophical achievement.”
Shimony questions the sufficiency of my reasons for supplementing my
1997 proof with the 2004 version[2]. He examines, consequently, not my new
proof but rather the explicitly counterfactual approach that I proposed in a
published reply to his earlier comments. That approach differs fundamentally
from the one used in my 2004 paper, but his proof of the validity of the two
propositions covers both formulations.
The proof constructed and criticized by Shimony lies within the general
framework of counterfactual reasoning, whereas my 2004 proof, although re-
taining some of the trappings and language of counterfactual argumentation,
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is based on a substantially different foundation. The combination of my as-
sumptions of “free choices” and of “no backward-in-time influence” amounts
to the assumption that theories covered by my new work are to be com-
patible with the idea of “fixed past, open future”. This conceptualization
circumvents, at the foundational level, the need for counterfactuals. It ac-
cords with the notion of an advancing “now” in which events occur that “fix
and settle” first the free choice made by any agent about which experiment
he will perform, and later the outcome of that freely chosen experiment. The
future is “open” in the sense that the choices in regions R and L of which
experiments are to be performed in those regions are required to be treat-
able, within the theory, as free choices that are made by the agents when
the moment “now” arrives. The subsequent “choice of the outcome of the
freely chosen experiment” is likewise required to be treatable, within the
class of theories to which the propositions apply, as undetermined until the
advancing moment “now” arrives, at which time the outcome also becomes
“fixed and settled”. These latter choices are termed “natures choices” and
are required to conform to the statistical rules of quantum theory. Treating
the theory in this way is supposed to be one adequate way of expressing the
content of the theory, although not necessarily the only possible way.
This switch from an approach formulated in the framework of “counter-
factuals” to one formulated in the framework of “fixed past, open future”
has no significant effect on the proofs of the two propositions. But it brings
the concepts being used into closer accord with those of orthodox quantum
thinking. Although philosophers contend that counterfactual concepts per-
vade science, and are needed for science, the significance of results based on
the use of counterfactuals remains somewhat shakey in the minds of most
quantum physicists. But the idea that the events already observed in the
past by somebody can be treated as if they are fixed and settled, and that
our future choices can be treated as if they free, agrees with the way that
physicists deal with their theories, with their theoretical practices, and with
their lives in general.
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Shimony’s objection to my interpretation begins with the assertion “But
SR is not an assertion about actually occurring events. It is a counterfactual
conditional”. This statement alone activates the intuitive distrust of scientist
in arguments based on counterfactuals. I shall deal presently with Shimonys
specific objection, raised within the framework of the counterfactual formu-
lation. But first I shall describe the application of the two propositions from
the “fixed past, open future” point of view that is more congenial with the
normal thinking of quantum physicists.
Why does Shimony claim that the validity of these two propositions lacks
scientific significance?
This wording is not exactly the way that Shimony put it. But scientific
significance is the basic issue. The theorems of Bell and his followers are
ultimately of value because they rule out certain possible models or theories
of nature. The pertinent questions are thus: Does the joint validity of my
two propositions rule out some models or theories of nature that are not
ruled out by Bells theorems? And does the joint validity of these two propo-
sitions rule out all of the local-hidden variable theories that are eliminated
by Bells theorem? If the joint validity of these two propositions does indeed
rule out all of the hidden-variable theories covered by Bells theorem, and
other theories besides, then these propositions are jointly stronger than Bells
Theorem, both because their consequences are stronger, they rule out more
theories, and also because their assumptions are weaker. In this connection it
is important to notice that it is not nature that is required to conform to the
assumptions. It is rather that a theory must, in order for these propositions
to be applicable to that theory, be such that the choice made by the exper-
imenter in the later region R can be treated as a free variable, effectively
undetermined until the moment of the decision, and that whatever outcome
has already been observed in the earlier region L can be considered to remain
undisturbed by the subsequent events. The premises of the two propositions
are thus conditions on the class of theories to which these propositions apply.
To see how this works, suppose you are trying to construct a local theory
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that agrees with the predictions of Quantum Theory. Then what has been
proved is that if this theory is merely such that (1) the experimenters choices
can be considered “free” (i.e., without any relevant causal roots), and (2)
what is observed to happen in region L can be considered to be fixed and
settled independently of whether R1 or R2 will later be freely chosen and
performed by the experimenter in region R, and (3) the predictions of quan-
tum theory for the Hardy experiments are valid, then the theory must, for
these experiments, satisfy the following two properties:
I. If L2 is performed in L, then if R2 were to be performed and were to
give outcome + then if R1 were to be performed, the outcome would always
be −.
II. If L1 is performed in L, then if R2 were to be performed and were
to give outcome + then if R1 were to be performed the outcome would
sometimes be +.
I have eliminated here the counterfactual terminology that was employed
in my counterfactual-based 1997 paper, and that was retained in my 2004
paper for the sake of historical continuity. I have adopted here the language
appropriate to the assumptions of my 2004 paper, which, as emphasized
above, are concordant with the idea of fixed past open future. The two
propositions pertain to the structure of a theory in which the free variables
are the open choices to be made by the experimenters as to which experi-
ments will be performed, and the two propositions are assertions pertaining
to relationships that then follow from the combination of the assumption of
the validity of the relevant predictions of quantum theory, together with the
idea that the outcomes that have already been observed by some human wit-
ness in one region can be treated as fixed and settled, and hence completely
unalterable by subsequent free choices made in a region space-like separated
from the first.
Although something akin to hidden variables might be entailed by these
propositions, any such structure is here a consequence of our fixed past,
open future assumptions, together with the assumptions of the validity of
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predictions of QM. These consequences are not as strong as Bell’s hidden-
variable assumptions.
These two propositions, taken together, entail the presence in region R
of information about the free choice made in L between L1 and L2: no
theory that satisfies these to propositions can be “local” in the sense that it
is logically compatible with an exclusion of all faster-than-light transfers of
information.
No local-hidden-variable theory can satisfy both of these properties: In
such a theory the observable properties are fixed and definite whether they
are measured of not, and they do not depend upon which experiment is chosen
and performed far away. That combination of conditions is not compatible
with the validity of these two propositions.
No Bell-type hidden-variable assumption has entered into the proof of
the two properties. These two propositions are consequences simply of the
assumptions that the theory is compatible with the theoretical concept of
“fixed past, open future”, in conjunction with the validity of predictions of
quantum theory for this Hardy-type experiment.
Relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) is compatible with the premises
of the propositions. This is shown by the works of Tomonaga[6] and Schwinger[7]
(TS), where an advancing surface “now” is a parameterized space-like sur-
face σ(τ) such that for τ ′ less than τ the surface σ(τ ′) lies nowhere later than
σ(τ), but is somewhere earlier. In the TS formulation there exists a fixed
history of the evolution of the state vector Ψ(σ(τ)) for all σ(τ) up until the
present time “Now”. In that formulation there is also, in association with the
fixing of any outcome, a change of the state vector Ψ(σ(τ)) that produces an
instantaneous transfer of information along the space-like surfaces σ(τ). But
in spite of the existence within the TS formulation of RQFT of this instanta-
neous information transfer along space-like surfaces, all the predictions of the
theory about outcomes of measurements conform to the requirement of rela-
tivity theory that no such prediction pertaining to an experiment performed
in one space-time region can depend upon which experiment is chosen and
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performed in a second space-time region that is situated space-like relative
to the first.
The fact that the TS formulation of RQFT does involve faster-than-light
information transfers does not by itself entail that the existence of such trans-
fers is an intrinsic feature of RQFT itself. There are other formulations that
focus directly on connections between observables, and in which no trace of
faster-than-light information transfer is evident. However, application of the
two propositions requires merely that theory under examination be “com-
patible with” the concepts of “fixed past, open future”, in the sense that,
without altering the content of the theory, the choice between R1 and R2
can be treated as free, and the outcome of the earlier observation in L can
be treated as fixed and settled prior to the fixing of the later choice in R The
validity of this assumption is entailed by the TS formulation of RQFT, and
hence RQFT itself is covered by arguments based on the validity of the two
propositions.
The general conclusion is that no theory that can be treated in accor-
dance with the idea of fixed past, open future, and that accords with the
quantum predictions for the Hardy experiments, can be reconciled with a
locality requirement that bans all faster-than-light transfer of information.
The requirement of compatibility with the idea of fixed-past-open-future is
compatible with orthodox quantum thinking and is weaker than Bell’s as-
sumption of hidden variables, which contradicts orthodox quantum thinking.
We now turn to the two key questions:
1. Does Shimonys analysis expose any flaw in this fixed-past-open-future
argument?
2. Does Shimonys analysis expose any flaw in the corresponding counterfactual-
based argument?
I shall argue that the answer to both questions is No!
Shimony asserts that “The error in Stapp’s argument is his claim that SR
is a statement about region R alone.” But what I actually said, as he correctly
recorded, was that “the truth or falsity of SR is defined by conditions on the
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truth or falsity of statements describing possible events located in region.”.
This difference in wording is significant. My argument, given above, is based
on my wording: I proved two propositions that both follow from the stated
assumptions, but that are—because of the fact that their truth or falsity is
defined by conditions on the truth or falsity of statements describing events
located in R–jointly incompatible with a ban on transfer of information to
R of the choice between L1 and L2 made by the experimenter in region L.
Shimony treats the entire statement SR, which involves counterfactuals, as a
unit that incorporates, within itself, my key assumption that what happened
in L was fixed and settled before the decision between R1 and R2 was made,
whereas I take this key assumption to be a restriction on the class of theories
within which the pair of propositions is proved to be true.
This latter approach of taking the stated assumptions to be conditions on
the class of theories in which the two propositions are jointly true is a direct
and completely legitimate way to proceed. Incorporating the key assump-
tion of no-backward-in-time influence into the meaning of a counterfactual
statement is less satisfactory for two reasons. In the first place the mere use
of statements about events that in principle can never happen, because some
contrary thing has been asserted to have definitely happened tends by itself
to render the argument less than ideally rock solid in the minds of physi-
cists. On the other hand, speaking directly about properties of a class of
theories that satisfy certain specified conditions that are themselves in line
with quantum philosophy, and are actually satisfied by relativistic quantum
field theory, is a far more transparent approach that is less likely to enshroud
subtle difficulties. The second reason is the closely connected fact that the
scrambling the key causality assumption into the meaning of the words that
express contrary-to-fact assertions opens the door to possible confusion.
The essential point here is that one must be careful not to introduce any
assumption that injects implicitly into the theory the transfer of information
from L to R that the joint validity of the two propositions reveals to be
present. Shimony’s criticism possesses a certain initial aura of credibility due
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to the fact that introducing any causal connection between events in R and
in L harbors the danger of injecting implicitly some hidden assumption of the
very influence from L to R that the argument eventually reveals. If a hidden
assumption of an influence from R to L is smuggled into the assumptions then
the fact that such a connection eventually emerges would lack significance.
On the other hand, if no such assumption is smuggled in, and the conclusion
that there must be transfer of information from L to R follows logically
from completely legitimate assumptions that include in an essential way the
pertinent predictions of quantum theory, then the conclusion pertaining to
the theories in question must be deemed to be logically valid.
It is well-know that quantum theory is completely compatible with the
absence of faster-than-light influences in one direction, provided such in-
fluences are allowed in other directions. The question at issue is whether
one can simultaneously forbid faster-than-light influences in all directions.
Hence if we wish to prove the need for faster-than-light influence in some
direction then we can legitimately proceed by excluding faster-than-light ac-
tion in one direction, say right to left, and then showing that this restriction,
when combined with the assumption of the validity of pertinent predictions
of quantum theory, entails the need for faster-than-light transfer of informa-
tion in the other direction, namely from left to right. This is the completely
legitimate line of argument that I employ.
The first part of this legitimate argument is implemented by my assump-
tion that the earlier observed outcome in L is fixed and settled, independently
of what the later free choice in R will be. This assumption of not a hidden as-
sumption of the existence of an action from left to right. It is the completely-
legitimate-in-this-context demand that there be no action from right to left.
This assumption, by itself, does not entail any influence from left to right.
Only when combined with the predictions of quantum theory does it lead
to the conclusion that there must be information transfer from left to right.
Thus the requirement of no action from right to left, whether regarded as a
condition on the class of covered theories, or as part of the meaning of SR,
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is completely legitimate, in the context of this proof. But Shimonys analysis
does not distinguish this completely-legitimate-in-this-context assumption of
no action from right to left from what would be a completely illegitimate
assumption of action from left to right.
The logical structure of the proof—with the two very different statuses
of (1) the input assumption of no action from right to left and (2) the re-
sulting output conclusion of a necessary transfer of information from left to
right—is revealed far more clearly and directly in the fixed-past-open-future
formulation of the conditions for applicability of two propositions than in
an approach that mixes counterfactual concepts into the meanings of the
words appearing in the proofs. If that latter approach is used, then it is
necessary in principle to unpack the counterfactual statements in order to
clearly distinguish between legitimate inputs and possible illegitimate ones.
Shimonys counterfactual-based analysis fails make this crucial distinction.
In lieu of making this distinction within the counterfactual approach, the
alternative and simpler way to verify the validity of the basic claim is to
work directly from the assumptions of my 2004 paper, in the way described
above, and thereby circumvent the subtlties introduced by the avoidable use
of counterfactuals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank J. Finkelstein for very useful comments on an earlier much shorter
draft of this paper. This work was supported in part by the Director, Office
of Science, Office of High Energy and Nuclear Physics of the U.S. Department
of Energy under contract No. DE-AC03-76SF00098.
REFERENCES
1. Abner Shimony, “An Analysis of Stapp’s ‘A Bell-type theorem without
hidden variables’ ”, Foundations of Physics, Preceding Paper.
2. Henry P. Stapp, “A Bell-type theorem without hidden variables”,
American Journal of Physics, 72, 30-33 (2004).
3. Henry P. Stapp, “Nonlocal character of quantum theory”, American
Journal of Physics, 65, 300-304 (1997).
9
4. John S. Bell, “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox”, Physics 1,
195-200 (1964).
5 J.F. Clauser and A. Shimony, “Bells theorem: Experimental tests and
implications”, Reports on Progress in Physics 41, 1881-1927 (1978).
6. S. Tomonaga, “On a relativistically invariant formulation of the quan-
tum theory of wave fields,” Prog. Theor. Phys.1, 27-42 (1946).
7. J. Schwinger, “The theory of quantized fields I,” Phys. Rev. 82,
914-927 (1951).
10
